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COMMENTS
attorneys should, therefore, avoid this expression unless it is used in con-
junction with other descriptive words that give it a definite meaning.,"
Otherwise, litigation that could have been avoided may ensue to unravel the
meaning posed by the use of the term ground rent in a document. 3
CHARLES B. SLOANE.
PROPER SUBJECTS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER
FEDERAL LEGISLATION .
The subjects of collective bargaining are numerous and varied. Those
generally accepted by both labor and management as proper subjects include
the following: wage rates, hours of employment, overtime, discharge, sus-
pension, layoff, recalls, seniority, discipline, promotion, transfer, plant safety
and sanitation together with protection of health in the place af employment.'
On the other hand other subjects are usually considered to be the sole
prerogative of management and therefore not proper subjects of collective
bargaining. Those subjects in this category usually include the corporate or
other structure of the business, the location of plants, production schedules,
the number and personnel of the official and supervisory force, and processes
and means of manufacturing. 2
Having already achieved, to a great extent, the direct benefits of proper
wages, reasonable hours and healthful working conditions, union efforts re-
cently have been and continue to be directed to matters which yield indirect
benefits that could aptly be described as fringe issues. These subjects have
caused much litigation before the National Labor Relations Board3 and in
federal courts. In the main, management has contended that such matters
92. A provision in a trust agreement providing for the investment in "ground rents" is
as indefinite as a provision to invest in "real property." A carefully worded provision
might state: "The trustee shall have the power to buy and sell only such irredeemable
ground rents as exist incident to land in Pennsylvania and that are recognized by the law
of Pennsylvania and which yield not less than four per cent interest at the time of purchase
by the trustee. Furthermore the irredeemable ground rent must expressly provide that
the owner thereof shall have the rights of distress and re-entry should there be a default
in the payment of the ground rent. The trustee shall not have the power to purchase any
irredeemable ground rent that is encumbered by a mortgage, judgment or any other lien
whatsoever."
It is the practice of some title companies to insure the title of the grantee except
for such "encumbrances or ground rents" as exist against the land, As all ground rents
are encumbrances of land this statement adequately protects the title company; but the
grantee should be cautioned to check against all types of ground rents to ascertain to what
extent his property is covered by the title insurance policy.
93. Camp v. Byrd, 229 U.S. 530 (1913) ("ground rent" held to include the reversion-
ary interest); Moran v. Hlammersla, 188 Md. 382, 52 A.2d 727 (1947) (ground rent
agreement too indefinite to permit specific performance).
1. 1 CCH LAB. LAw REP. § 3020.
2. Ibid.
3. Hereinafter the National Labor Relations Board will be referred to simply as the
board.
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as pension plans, merit increases, insurance plans and retirement programs
are not compulsory subjects of collective bargaining.
The mandatory collective bargaining requirement was embraced mainly
in Sections 8(5) and 9(a) of the original National Labor Relations Act.4
Section 8(5) of the original act requires an employer "to bargain collectively
with the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of Section
9(a)." The latter section provided that the duly selected representative
of the employees in an appropriate unit shall be their exclusive representative
"for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." These sections
were re-enacted in Sections 8(a)5 and 9(a) of the amended act5 without
material change.8
The statutory language, "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or
other conditions of employment," defines the matters as to which the statute
requires collective bargaining by the employer.7 It has been held that this
language requires collective bargaining as to all matters affecting the em-
ployees as a class.8 The contention of management that the language of the
statute should be limited to matters which were historically the subject of
collective bargaining as of the date of its adoption has been rejected. 9
The question of unfair labor practice as it relates to management's re-
fusal to bargain in good faith may arise in one of two ways. Either the
management may unilaterally put into effect some new plan affecting the
workers, or the union may request bargaining on a subject and management
refuses on the ground that it is not a subject intended to be covered by the
act. It is desirable to keep this in mind in the following discussion of spe-
cific subjects of collective bargaining since the decisions of the board and
the courts have almost without exception been favorable to the union where
the dispute arose out of unilateral action taken by the employer.
Welfare Benefits
It has been held that the word "wages" following the words "rates of
pay" in the act was intended to cover all direct and immediate economic
benefits flowing from the employment relationship.10 It is with this basic
thought that group insurance plans, pensions and retirement plans have
been held to be subjects of required bargaining under the act.
4. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(5), 159(a) (1947) commonly referred
to as the Wagner Act.
5. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 SrAT. 140, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a)
(Supp. 1947) popularly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act.
6. Hereinafter the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act will simply be called the act.
7. .1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
8. Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
9. W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) (Congress intended
to impose upon employers a duty to bargain collectively with their employees' representa-
tives with respect to any matter which might in the future emerge as a "bone of conten-
tion" between them, provided it of course should be a matter "in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment").
10. W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
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In a case" involving a group insurance plan, the court reasoned that a
group insurance plan provides a financial cushion in the event of illness or
injury arising outside the scope of employment at less cost than could be
obtained through contracts of insurance negotiated individually and, thus,
the term "wages" in the act was intended to include such benefits. Since
group insurance programs are held a proper subject of collective bargaining,
an employer may not, by unilateral action, expand an already existing plan
without violating his duty to bargain as to wages and other conditions of
employment. 12
Pension payments were held to be "wages" or at least to be included in
"conditions of employment."' 3 The court reasoned that such plans were an
inducement to the worker to accept employment and therefore affected his
financial status. Payments under such a plan are distinguishable from volun-
tary payments made on the marriage of an employee or at the birth of his
child, since they form a part of the consideration for work performed.
Paid holidays, vacations and bonuses have been held to be integral part
of the earnings and working conditions of the employees and therefore proper
subjects of collective bargaining. 4 A Christmas bonus regularly paid to
employees was held to constitute one of the elements of compensation of
the workers, and therefore to be a term of their employment as to which the
employer was under an affirmative duty to bargain under the act, 5
Merit Increases and Incentive Pay Plans
Employers must bargain with the representatives of their employees
concerning individual merit wage increases.'6 The mere fact that an em-
ployer labeled such merit increases as gratuitous did not obviate the fact that
such raises do effectuate changes in rates of pay and wages which by the act
were made the subject of collective bargaining.
The establishment of an incentive pay plan is by the act a proper subject
of collective bargaining.' 7 If the union requests negotiation of such a plan
the employer's unilateral establishment of one, which would affect the basic
wage rates of the employees set by an existing collective agreement, would
constitute a violation of the employer's duty to bargain under the act.'8
Miscellaneous Subjects
Where the employees had no public or employer-furnished means of
transportation to public eating places, it was held that the employer was
11. Ibid.
12. In re Consumers Lumber & Veneer Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 17 (1945).
13. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U.S.
960 (1949) (the employee would be entitled to sue and recover upon the refusal of the
company to pay benefits and therefore could not be regarded as a mere gift).
14. Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 313 U.S. 595(1941).
15. In re Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 627 (1946).
16. NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 336 U.S.
814 (948).
17Libby, MeNeill and Libby, 65 N.L.R.B. 873 (1946).
18. Ibid.
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under a duty to bargain on the price of meals furnished by the company.10
Similarly, company owned houses have been held to be of such interest to
employees in connection with their work that the employer was under
an obligation to bargain on the amount of rent to be charged. 20 The court
stated that in many instances houses owned by the employer are a necessary
part of the enterprise and the rent charged represents a substantial part of
the workers' remuneration. 2 1
There has been some litigation involving subjects having no relation to
financial remuneration. It has been held that the interpretation of an exist-
ing collective bargaining contract is a proper subject for negotiation between
a labor organization and an employer.22 Although it is not illegal for an
employer to insist on a management rights clause whereby the employer re-
serves the right to hire, discharge and discipline employees without recourse
to arbitration, such employer may not, without violating the act's good faith
bargaining requirement,23 change lunch periods or establish additional night
shifts without consulting the union while the contract is being negotiated.2 4
Waiver of Right to Bargain
Once a contract has been entered into between a union and an employer,
those matters which are not made a part of the contract but which are proper
subjects of collective bargaining remain open for bargaining unless expressly
waived by the contract.25 The board is reluctant to deprive employees of any
bargaining rights in the absence of a specific waiver on the particular sub-
ject.20 Even where the union agreed not to make demands on its social
security program including group insurance until a specific date, it was held
that such agreement did not give the employer the right to act unilaterally
on those issues without bargaining with the union 27
Conclusion
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the board and the courts
have taken a very broad view of what constitutes "wages", "rates of pay" or
"other conditions of employment." One of the chief reasons is that the
act was designed to lessen industrial strife. Many of the disputes over
whether a particular subject is a proper one arise when the employer takes
unilateral action thereon. In this situation there is a strong feeling of resent-
ment built up between the union and management. Therefore the board,
19. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
20. NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951).
21. Id. at 974.
22. Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942).
23. Not only is the employer required to bargain, but under the act the employer
must bargain in good faith. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (7th Cir.
1943).
24. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1951).
25. General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 221 (2nd Cir. 1950).
26. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949) (the union had agreed
to a waiver of the union's right to bargain on a pension plan).
27. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
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because of the danger of a strike, will immediately certify the question and
hold a hearing.
As we have seen, even after a contract is signed the union may request
bargaining on any proper subject unless there is a specific waiver in the signed
contract. The employer should keep this in mind and attempt to get waivers
signed on the subjects not covered by the contract.
The trend is to include more and more subjects as being proper for pur-
poses of collective bargaining. It is likely that, in the not too distant future,
some of the subjects that are now definitely considered management prerog-
atives will be held to be included within the orbit of compulsory subjects
of collective bargaining.
NORMAN D. WARFORD
